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Abstract
Most economists agree that the net effect of the deregulation movement in the United States
has been to increase efficiency, with resulting increases in consumer welfare. Because deregulation
contemplates the substitution of competition for regulation as the “regulator” of the deregulated
markets, deregulation increases the importance of antitrust law as a means of preventing unreg-
ulated firms from eliminating competition among themselves by mergers or price-fixing agree-
ments. This is a particularly important point to remind Europeans, in view of the fact that histor-
ically antitrust has played a smaller role in European than U.S. law. It is important that ‘competi-
tion‘ be understood in its correct economic sense, lest antitrust become another form of regulation.
Competition is not a matter of many sellers or low prices or frequent changes in prices or market
shares. It is properly regarded as the state in which resources are deployed with maximum effi-
ciency, and it is not so much the existence of actual rivalry, let alone any specific market structure
or behavior, as the potential for rivalry, that assures competition. The proper role of antitrust law is
to protect that potential by limiting mergers, preventing the formation and operation of cartels and
other horizontal price-fixing or market-dividing agreements or modalities, and, to a limited extent,
preventing abusive tactics by individually powerful firms. If that role is played effectively, then
most and perhaps all programs of public utility and common carrier regulation can be dismantled
without economic loss — indeed with considerable economic gains. That at least appears to be
the lesson of the U.S. deregulation movement.
I. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE
LAW APPROACH
THE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION ON
COMPETITION: THE EXPERIENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES
Richard A. Posner*
Determining the effects of deregulation on competition and
on economic performance more broadly is a relatively straight-
forward task-if the effects of regulation are known. The undo-
ing of those effects, after a period of transition, is what deregula-
tion brings about, is the effect of deregulation. At least this re-
sult is true on the plane of theory. It is important to check the
theory against experience, so far as that is known. A complicat-
ing factor is that deregulation often is only partial, and the ef-
fects of partial deregulation can be particularly complex and
sometimes perverse.' But the starting point of analysis should
surely be to try to grasp the effects of regulation.
Unfortunately for clarity, "regulation" is not a single thing,
even if attention is confined to a single country, as I shall be
doing. Understood most broadly, as government intervention in
social activity, regulation is pervasive, embracing the whole of
criminal, tort, contract, property, labor, securities, antitrust, and
environmental law, and a great deal besides. If regulation is un-
* ChiefJudge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, Uni-
versity of Chicago Law School. This is the slightly revised text of a paper given on
October 16, 1998, at a symposium on "The Competition Law of Deregulation" in Wei-
mar, Germany, sponsored by the Rechtswissenschaftliche Fakultat der Friedrich-Schil-
ler-UniversitdtJena. I thank Mark Baker for research assistance and the participants in
the symposium for their comments.
1. The most important example is in the banking industry, where the relaxation of
regulatory control enabled banks and savings and loan associations to make riskier
loans, while federal insurance of deposits remained in force and was not experience
rated-that is, the insurance premiums did not vary with the riskiness of the financial
institution's policies. This situation created an ultimately fatal temptation to excessive
risk taking because depositors were shielded from loss and the owners of the institution
would reap the entire profit from using this cheap source of funds (cheap because no
risk premium had to be paid) to make high-interest loans. See generally ALAN GArT,
REGULATION, DEREGULATION, RREGULATION: THE FUTURE OF BANKING, INSURANCE, AND
SECURITIES INDUSTRIES 25-26 and ch. 7 (John Wiley & Sons 1993).
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derstood in its broadest sense, to speak of deregulation becomes
misleading. In the United States at least, there is no general
movement toward reducing government intervention in the lives
of its citizens. Deregulation in the United States means the re-
moval or reduction of comprehensive controls over particular in-
dustries. These industries are what U.S. lawyers call the "regu-
lated industries," while recognizing that all industries were (and
are) regulated to a greater or a lesser extent. It was the relative
handful of comprehensively regulated industries that became
and has remained the focus of the deregulation movement,
which began in the late 1970s in the airline industry2 and has
continued ever since.3 The deregulation movement has actually
coincided with increased regulation of health, safety, and the la-
bor markets, which is why to speak of "deregulation" in the large
is misleading-regulation has changed rather than diminished.
The industries that were (some still are) comprehensively
regulated, and that thus have been the focus of the deregulation
movement, are found largely in four sectors of the U.S. econ-
omy. These are transportation, including aviation, trucking, rail-
roads, barges, pipelines, and taxi service; communications, in-
cluding telephony and its data counterparts, television, and par-
ticularly cable television; power, especially electrical power and
natural gas; and financial institutions, primarily banks but also
bank substitutes such as savings and loan associations. The de-
tails of regulation vary from industry to industry and a further
complication is that there is overlapping state and federal regu-
lation, often of the same companies. But there is a paradigmatic
form of comprehensive regulation, usually called public utility or
common carrier regulation or both. I will focus on that and in-
dicate the principal variants.
2. Actually the first deregulatory measure did not occur in the airline industry; it
was the abolition by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1975 of fixed stock-
brokerage commission rates. See GART, supra note 1, at 77. And beginning earlier, in
the late 1960s, a series of minor, but cumulatively significant, relaxations of the regula-
tion of interstate and international communications by the Federal Communications
Commission. Id.
3. For a well-written, case-study-oriented history of regulation and deregulation in
the United States, see RICHARD H.K. VIETOR, CONTRIVED COMPETITION: REGULATION
AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA (Belknap 1994); and for a fine economic treatise on
comprehensive regulation and its effects, see DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MAR-
KETS (MIT Press 1989). The deregulation movement is deftly analyzed in Joseph D.
Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98
COLUM. L. REv. 1323 (1998), with particular reference to its causes.
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It is particularly important for a European audience to un-
derstand that the vast majority of the enterprises that are subject
to comprehensive regulation in the United States, that is to pub-
lic utility or common carrier regulation-compendiously, "rate
of return" regulation-are private, profit-making companies.
There is some public ownership, in particular of local electrical
power companies, but it is very much the exception and I will
ignore it. Enterprises that in Europe are commonly and until
recently almost always publicly owned are in the United States
almost always privately owned. But when subject to rate of re-
turn regulation, these industries have less freedom than the stan-
dard capitalist enterprise. Most obvious, but not most impor-
tant, their profits are constrained to the regulatory agency's con-
ception of a "reasonable" level, that is, one that will cover their
costs with a margin large enough to attract the capital that the
regulated firm needs. The result is a regime of cost-plus pricing
to the extent of the agency's ability to monitor the firm's costs
and effectuate prompt downward adjustments. These qualifica-
tions are important. To the extent either that the agency cannot
prevent profits from being disguised as costs, or cannot bring
about prompt reductions in the regulated firm's prices during
periods of falling costs, the aim of placing the regulated firm's
pricing on a cost-plus basis will be blunted, whether for good or
for ill.
The control of profits is just the beginning of rate of return
regulation. In addition, and of particular importance, an agency
decides what prices the regulated firm shall be permitted to
charge to particular categories of customer in order to generate
the allowed return. Inevitably, the agency is also given the power
to limit the entry of new firms into the regulated firm's market.
The inevitability lies in the fact that without such power the
agency's control over the firm's pricing structure would be inef-
fectual. Suppose as in the telephone industry that the agency or,
in that case, agencies-telecommunications are regulated on
both the federal and the state level-decided that business cus-
tomers should pay more than residential customers, that local
calls should be priced below long-distance calls without regard to
cost, and that within each local area price should be invariant to
cost. When price is divorced from cost, some prices will be well
below cost and others well above cost. The latter will attract new
entrants by offering them the prospect of earning supracompeti-
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tive profits. The prospect of supracompetitive profits is not only
a magnet but also a mirage, as it will induce increased output
until prices fall to a level at which all the supracompetitive prof-
its have been competed away. The disappearance of these prof-
its will make it economically infeasible for the regulated firm to
serve customers in other markets below cost because it deprives
the firm of the profits that it needs to offset its losses in those
markets. In other words, competition invites "cream skimmers,"
who undermine the system of "cross-subsidization" by which reg-
ulated firms are able to serve some customers below cost without
losing money overall. This is why without regulatory control
over entry, regulatory control over price structure tends to col-
lapse. The cream skimmer is a type of arbitrageur, preventing a
type of price discrimination; arbitrage, when feasible and per-
mitted, is fatal to discrimination.
We should not suppose the regulated firm passive in the
face of regulatory controls. Its owners, managers, and workers
are, we may assume, utility-maximizers to the same extent as the
participants in unregulated firms. They want so far as possible to
bend the controls to their private benefit, evade them, or influ-
ence the regulatory agency, which as a part of government is po-
tentially subject to political pressure. Essentially, the goals of the
regulated firm in relation to the agency are manipulative. The
means include, as I have mentioned already, hiding profits in
costs, for example by purchasing supplies from wholly owned
but unregulated subsidiaries at inflated prices that can be cov-
ered in its allowed rates, as costs to the regulated firm. Another
means of manipulating the regulatory structure to the regulated
firm's advantage is by avoiding risk-taking, since the regulatory
profit constraint will prevent the firm from reaping the full ben-
efit, and, even more important, will minimize uncertainty and
maximize stability. The regulatory constraints make it difficult
for the firm to respond quickly to changed circumstances. Still
other manipulative tactics are proposing to the regulatory
agency a pricing structure that rewards or even creates political
allies of the regulated firm (and notice that the more skewed the
pricing structure, the stronger the firm's case will be for barring
the entry of competing firms, which would unravel the struc-
ture); paying wages that make the firm's workers additional
political allies of the firm; and, more broadly, adopting a mental-
ity in which political sensitivity takes the place of marketing skill
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and entrepreneurial vigor. The regulated firm's real "cus-
tomer" is the regulatory agency itself, meaning that the firm is
operating in a political market rather than in an economic mar-
ket in the sense of a market in which output is determined by
bargaining between consumers and suppliers.
In the heyday of rate of return regulation, before the dereg-
ulation movement got going, the following economic conse-
quences were observed: costs were high because of the weakness
of cost-cutting incentives that a regime of cost-plus pricing cre-
ates, and therefore average prices were high (an essential qualifi-
cation, given the price structure). They may have been as high
as they would have been without regulation, even in industries
such as electrical power distribution where there are substantial
natural monopoly elements.4 In addition, prices were highly
skewed in relation to costs.' Entry, therefore, was infrequent;
frequent entry would have tugged prices back in line with costs.
Product and service variety, and responsiveness to changing and
idiosyncratic consumer demands generally, were low, and tech-
nical quality and reliability high. These features of the compre-
hensively regulated industries reflected the importance, in a re-
gime of rate of return regulation, of certainty and stability, be-
cause the regulatory structure prevents the firm from changing
course rapidly in response to shifting patterns of competition
and consumer demand. Emphasis on certainty and stability in
turn invites domination of a firm by engineers, who seek to
shape demand to their own notions of what customers should
want (for they think they know better than their customers),
rather than by sales people, for whom customer preference is
sovereign. The effect of comprehensive regulation in delaying
the introduction of new services requires emphasis because of
the enormous losses in consumer welfare that such delays can
cause. It has been responsibly estimated that regulation-im-
posed delays in voice-messaging and cellular-phone service alone
cost consumers more than US$50 billion a year.6
4. See PAUL W. MAcAvoY, INDUSTRY REGULATION AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY 32-35 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1992), and studies cited there. On the
rapidly expanding deregulation of electrical power in the United States, see Kathryn
Kranhold, Wall Street Journal Reports: Energy, WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 1998, at R1.
5. See MAcAvov, supra note 4, at 33-34 (referring to telephone rates). Airline
prices and railroad and trucking rates were also affected. Id. at 33-34, 36-37.
6. Jerry A. Hausmann, Valuing the Effect of Regulation on New Services in Telecommuni-
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Regulatory obstacles to entry tended, paradoxically, to pre-
serve large numbers of firm in many of the comprehensively reg-
ulated industries. The most efficient firms in the economy were
blocked from gobbling up less efficient firms operating in regu-
lated markets; within those markets, competition, which would
have forced the less efficient firms into bankruptcy or merger,
was disparaged both by the regulated agencies and by the char-
acteristic mindset of the managers of the regulated firms, be-
cause of the uncertainty that competition introduced, the pres-
sure on costs that it exerted, and its destabilizing effect on regu-
lated price structures. Regulated firms were also prohibited or
discouraged from diversifying, lest diversification complicate or
even defeat the regulatory task by enabling the firms to shift the
costs of their nonregulated activities to the captive ratepayers in
the regulated market. When allowed profits generously ex-
ceeded costs-as in the airline industry,7 where the regulatory
agency conceived its function to be to promote and not merely
regulate commercial aviation, yet price competition was lim-
ited-there was excessive service competition as regulated firms
vied to get more business at supracompetitive prices.
Two qualifications need to be noted. The first is that rate of
return regulation makes a certain, though not compelling,'
amount of sense in industries that are natural monopolies, that
is industries in which economies of scale are so large in relation
to demand that one firm can serve the entire market at lower
average cost than two or more firms. In such an industry, if
there were no rate regulation, prices might be set at levels that
generated substantial monopoly profits and would thus exceed
the price level under profit-constraining regulation. This result
is only a possibility; regulation might induce higher costs, which
might take the place of lower profits and leave the price level as
high as it would be without regulation. In any event, modern
technology has made natural monopoly rare9 except on the local
cations, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcriVrrv. MICROECONOMICS 1997 1, 35
(Martin Neil Baily, et al. eds. 1998).
7. See MACAvoY, supra note 4, at 35.
8. See Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 518
(1969).
9. A good example is the decline in economies of scale in electric-power genera-
tion, which has facilitated substantial deregulation in the electric-power industry. See
Matthew W. White, Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in Electricity Markets, in
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level, where it is sometimes, though by no means always, un-
economical to duplicate a capital-intensive, large-capacity distri-
bution network, such as that of a city's electrical or telephone
ducts and cables. With the advent of cellular phones, cable tele-
vision, satellite systems, and low-cost fiber-optic networks, even
local telephone service is rapidly becoming naturally competi-
tive, though the refusal of state regulatory agencies to abandon
their control over the pricing structure of local telephone service
means that most of the benefits of the new competition have
gone to business users.1 ° In any event, no natural monopolies
have been deregulated, and so they need not be considered in
an analysis of the effects of deregulation.
The second qualification is that not all heavily regulated in-
dustries employ or employed rate of return regulation, the most
important exception being banking and other regulated finan-
cial institutions. Regulators have not tried to limit the profits of
banks or told them what prices to charge to particular custom-
ers. The overriding thrust of regulation has been to reduce the
risk of insolvency. This has been done both by limiting competi-
tion through limitations on new entry, particularly interstate
branching, through the prohibition against paying interest on
demand deposits, and by limiting the riskiness of the lending
and other activities of the banks, for example by keeping banks
out of nonbanking businesses. Yet the result of this rather differ-
ent form of regulation has been similar to that of rate of return
regulation: a huge number of small, inefficient firms; high costs
of operation; managerial focus on pleasing regulators rather
than on catering to customers' varying needs; and market seg-
mentation taken to absurd lengths. Banks are limited in the
number of offices they can have and in their geographical scope,
and are blocked from entering complementary activities such as
securities underwriting and mortgage financing, while other fi-
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMY AcIVrnI. MICROECONOMICS 1996 201 (Martin Neil
Baily, et al. eds. 1997).
10. These developments are well discussed in Robert G. Harris & C. Jeffrey Kraft,
Meddling Through: Regulating the Local Telephone Competition in the United States, J. ECON.
PERP. 1997 93. The authors are particularly critical of the federal Telecommunications
Act of 1996, which though touted as a deregulation measure (which in part it was),
imposed a number of complex and onerous new regulatory requirements. See also
Nicholas Economides, U.S. Telecommunications Today, 1998 Bus. ECON., at 7; Gregory
Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulation and Managed Competition in Network Industries, 15
YALE J. OF REG. 177 (1998).
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nancial institutions are barred from accepting demand deposits.
Many of these restrictions have now been eliminated or relaxed,
to the point where the financial-services industry can be re-
garded as largely though not completely deregulated.
I have said enough about the effects of regulation to set the
stage for a discussion of the effects of deregulation. I will sketch
the effects in general but punctuate my description with some
examples from particular industries. Before doing that, how-
ever, I should point out that although the form of regulation
that I have described will strike many Europeans as strange to
the point of weirdness, the effects of deregulation have rele-
vance to the European situation. For deregulation in the U.S.
context essentially involves the elimination of a type of govern-
ment intervention that prevents competition from working effec-
tively. The deregulated world is the competitive world, and so
the experience of the deregulated industries in the United States
offers a glimpse of what European economies are likely to look
like if they subject the industries that we have deregulated to a
competitive regime.
Another point to bear in mind is the difference between the
economic and financial effects of deregulation. The former are
the effects on how resources are allocated. The latter are the
effects on the balance sheets of the regulated firms (and their
suppliers, competitors, customers, and so on, but I shall ignore
these secondary financial effects). The former are far more im-
portant in the long run; the latter largely represent a temporary
redistribution of wealth, for example from the owners of and
workers in regulated firms to consumers. An example of the lat-
ter type of effect is "stranded costs.""1 Suppose an electrical util-
ity has invested enormous amounts of capital in nuclear or other
generation facilities in the expectation of being able to recoup
its investment in the rates set by the public utility commission.
Suppose now that competitive entry is permitted. The new en-
trant, unless he has sunk costs comparable to those of the incum-
bent, will have no inhibition against pricing below existing rates
in order to capture a share of the business. By doing this he may
even drive it into bankruptcy. Should this result be prevented by
forbidding entry until the investment has been amortized? The
economist is inclined to say "no," that the financial distress of
11. See White, supra note 9.
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the regulated firm's shareholders is not an argument against the
more efficient utilization of society's scarce economic resources
that is enabled by competition.
The most important effects of deregulation are on industry
structure (number and scope of firms), costs, pricing patterns,
innovation, product or service variety, and managerial attitudes.
The removal of what I am calling comprehensive regulation ex-
poses the regulated firm to competition and new entry. The
consequence is irresistible pressure for what in the European
context is called "rationalization," that is, for organizing the in-
dustry in the most efficient pattern. This structure may mean
more firms,12 fewer firms,1 3 more vertical integration, less verti-
cal integration, or in short different firm sizes and scales-not to
mention different firms! The point is only that an industry
whose structure is optimal in the light of the comprehensive reg-
ulation to which the industry is subject is unlikely to be optimal
in a competitive environment. Rationalization has been esti-
mated to lower the costs of the railroad industry by US$3 billion
a year and those of the trucking industry by more than twenty
percent a year.
14
The opening of a formerly comprehensively regulated in-
dustry to entry is bound to affect the structure of prices, often
dramatically, as in the airline and telecommunications indus-
tries.1 5 As I noted earlier, without control over entry, a structure
in which some prices are below cost and others far enough above
cost to finance the resulting losses is untenable. The new en-
12. Dramatically so in the trucking industry, where the number of interstate firms
tripled in the 13 years following deregulation. Jane N. Feitler, et al., Measuring Firm
Strategic Change in the Regulated and Deregulated Motor Carrier Industry: An 18 Year Evalua-
tion, 33 LOG. AND TRANS. R. 159 (1997).
13. Between the beginning of banking deregulation in the late 1970s, and 1994,
the number of banks in the United States fell by more than a third. See Allan N. Berger
et al., The Transformation of the US. Banking Industry: What a Long, Strange Trip It's Been,
in BROOINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC Acrrvrrv, 132-33 (1995).
14. The authors do not partition this change between regulation and other factors.
See Curtis Grimm & Robert J. Windle, Regulation and Deregulation in Surface Freight, Air-
lines and Telecommunications, in REG. REFORM AND LAB. MARKETS 15, 24, 28 (James Peo-
ples, ed. 1998).
15. Price instability has been an additional consequence of airline deregulation,
but it is doubtful that it should be considered an economic (or any other kind of)
problem. See Steven A. Morrision & Clifford Winston, Causes and Consequences of Airline
Fare Wars, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC AcrIwan. MICROECONOMICS 1996 85
(Martin Neil Baily et al. eds. 1998).
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trants will target the high-price markets, forcing the incumbent
firm to lower its prices in those markets and, to avoid overall
losses, raise its prices in those markets in which it had been
charging prices below cost. In the United States, this has meant
lower prices for long-distance telephone calls and business calls
and higher prices for local residential service. In the airline in-
dustry, it has meant lower prices on long hauls and higher prices
on short hauls. Since deregulation involves higher as well as
lower prices, it is difficult to gauge the net effect on price levels,
but the evidence, consistent with theory, is that those levels have
fallen in real, that is, inflation and quality-adjusted, terms.
The effect of deregulation on price structure makes clear
that deregulation affects the distribution of wealth as well as ag-
gregate wealth. Even if consumers as a whole are better off be-
cause of deregulation, particular groups of consumers-those
who enjoyed below-cost rates subsidized by monopoly rates to
other consumers-may experience a decline in net welfare. An-
other distributive effect is the reduction in economic rents to
workers employed in the formerly regulated industries, 16 since,
as suggested earlier, the regulated firms had "shared" some of
their excess profits with their workers. The distributive effects of
deregulation are a critical factor in its political feasibility.
The most important consequence of deregulation may have
been on managerial mentalities17 and, as a result, on product
and service variety and on innovation. A comprehensively regu-
lated firm tends, as I have said, to be politically sensitive and
plan-driven in the sense of subordinating responsiveness to con-
sumers' shifting desires to the interest in steady, predictable firm
development. A competitive firm cares little for politics and is
driven by the competitive imperative of giving the consumer
what he wants when he wants it. Nowhere has the change in
orientation between a regulated and a competitive environment
been more dramatic than in telecommunications. The Ameri-
16. See James Peoples, Concluding Observations, in REG. REFORM AND LAB. MARKETS,
at 363, 367-68 (James Peoples, ed. 1998)
17. Grimm & Windle, supra note 14, at 25. Under deregulation of rail transporta-
tion, the average age of managers fell, their years of services with the particular railroad
employing them fell, and their years of formal education rose-all this implying a shift
toward a more flexible, less hidebound, and more educated managerial group. Young
people are on average more comfortable with change than old, and general human
capital equips a person to cope with change better than firm-specific human capital.
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can Telephone and Telegraph Company ("AT&T") in its heyday,
though technologically progressive, was famously unresponsive
to businesses' and consumers' varied wants. It focused on mak-
ing steady cost reductions for a highly standardized package of
services, enabling it to reap profits by keeping one step ahead of
the regulators, who set prices on the basis of past rather than
current and future costs. Deregulation revealed an enormous
heterogeneity of demands for telecommunications services, to
which a newly competitive industry responded with imagination
and alacrity. The direction of innovation changed dramatically,
from reducing the cost of existing services to creating new serv-
ices.
In superficially paradoxical contrast, the airline industry has
witnessed the "commodification" of air travel. In the regulated
era of restricted price competition, airlines vied with one an-
other to provide a luxurious, glamorous service-symbolized by
the piano bars that American Airlines installed in its Boeing 747
airliners-that would attract the customers of other airlines.
The cost of this non-price competition eventually swallowed the
supracompetitive profits enabled by regulation, and when this
occurred the industry, ceasing to benefit from regulation, was
ripe for deregulation. Competition quickly identified a huge un-
tapped demand for no-frills service, which the airlines quickly
moved to fill. The result has been an enormous increase in the
volume of air traffic coupled with a substantial fall in real prices.
It has been estimated that by 1993, average airline fares had
fallen in real, that is, inflation-adjusted, terms by twenty percent
because of deregulation.' 8
As mention of corporate "mentalities" suggests, the effects
of deregulation are mediated by decisions made by the formerly
regulated firm. Deregulation does not bring about automatic
changes in firm behavior. It changes the incentives facing man-
agement, and managers differ in their ability to respond intelli-
gently to changes in incentives. Empirical study suggests that
older firms, firms that were profitable before deregulation, and
family firms are apt to be more sluggish in responding to the
challenges of deregulation than firms having the opposite attrib-
utes. 9 Of particular interest because of America's troubled race
18. Steven A. Morrison & Clifford Winston, TheFare Skies, 1997 BROOKINGS REv. 42.
19. Id. at 166-67.
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relations, deregulation has been found to reduce racial discrimi-
nation in the formerly regulated industries, presumably by in-
creasing the return to meritocratic hiring practices.2 °
In summary, most economists agree that the net effect of
the deregulation movement in the United States has been to in-
crease efficiency, with resulting increases in consumer welfare.2
Because deregulation contemplates the substitution of com-
petition for regulation as the "regulator" of the deregulated mar-
kets, deregulation increases the importance of antitrust law as a
means of preventing unregulated firms from eliminating compe-
tition among themselves by mergers or price-fixing agree-
ments. 22  This is a particularly important point to remind
Europeans, in view of the fact that historically antitrust has
played a smaller role in European than U.S. law. It is important
that "competition" be understood in its correct economic sense,
lest antitrust become another form of regulation. Competition
is not a matter of many sellers or low prices or frequent changes
in prices or market shares. It is properly regarded as the state in
which resources are deployed with maximum efficiency, and it is
not so much the existence of actual rivalry, let alone any specific
market structure or behavior, as the potential for rivalry, that
assures competition. The proper role of antitrust law is to pro-
tect that potential by limiting mergers, preventing the formation
and operation of cartels and other horizontal price-fixing or
market-dividing agreements or modalities, and, to a limited ex-
tent, preventing abusive tactics by individually powerful firms. If
that role is played effectively, then most and perhaps all pro-
grams of public utility and common carrier regulation can be
dismantled without economic loss-indeed with considerable
economic gains. That at least appears to be the lesson of the
U.S. deregulation movement.
Earlier, I mentioned how the competing away of regulation-
induced profits in the airline industry set the stage for deregula-
20. SeeJohn S. Heywood, Regulated Industries and Measures of Earnings Discrimination,
in REG. REFORM AND LAB. MARKETS, 287 (James Peoples, ed.)
21. See STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF THE AIRLINE
INDUSTRY (Brookings Inst. 1995); Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, The Benefits of
Branching Deregulation, ECON. POL'Y REv.-FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YOK, Dec.
1997, at 13.
22. Severin Borenstein, The Evolution of U.S. Airline Competition, J. OF ECON. PERP.,
Spring 1992, at 45.
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tion in that industry. This fact is a clue to the politics of deregu-
lation,2S one that I have not emphasized in this Essay (though it
is vital to the feasibility of deregulation), both because it is some-
what to one side of the issue of the effects of deregulation on
competition and because the relevant politics differ greatly from
country to country, making the U.S. experience of limited rele-
vance to the European deregulation movement. But it is worth
pointing out, in closing, that regulation, deregulation, and re-
regulation are all favored by economic distress. The Great De-
pression of the 1930s led to an enormous expansion in the scope
of public utility and common carrier regulation, and the "stagfla-
tion" (inflation accompanied by a slowdown in economic
growth) of the 1970s set the stage for the deregulation move-
ment. Should the nation encounter serious economic distress in
the future, regulation may be reinstituted, confirming the exist-
ence of a regulatory cycle. This possibility makes it all the more
important that we understand the economic consequences of
regulation and deregulation.
23. See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 3, at 1394-97.
